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ATTORNEY G E N E R A L 
RAYMOND A. HINTZE KIRK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy Chief Deputy 
October 1,2004 
Ms. Patricia Bartholomew 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State Street, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: State v. Cornell, 20030667-SC 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
The State respectfully submits this letter pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The State considers that the following two cases relevant to the Court's disposition 
of this case: State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276 (finding no plain error in trial court's 
omission of the word, "speedy" from plea colloquy under rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure), and State v. Manning, 2004 UT App 87, f t 25, 29-30 n.10, 89 P.3d 196 (finding that 
trial court's statement to defendant that the defendant's right to appeal was "very limited" 
sufficient to satisfy rule 11(e)(8) requirement). 
Respectfully 
Kenneth A. Bronston 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Kent R. Hart 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, SIXTH FLOOR • P.O. Box 140854 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854 • TEL: (801) 366-0180 • FAX* (801) 366-0167 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Wallace Wayne DEAN, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 20020952. 
July 27, 2004. 
Background: Defendant was convicted on his plea of 
guilty in the District Court, Cedar City Department, 
Robert T. Braithwaite, J., of assault and felony and 
misdemeanor child abuse. Defendant appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, 57 P.3d 1106, reversed. State 
petitioned for writ of certiorari. 
Holding: The Supreme Court, Durham, C.J., held that 
no obvious error resulted from trial court's statement to 
defendant during plea colloquy that he had right to a 
"trial by jury" rather than "a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury," as set forth in rule governing pleas. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. 
West Headnotes 
HI Criminal Law €=>1134(7) 
110k! 134(7) Most Cited Cases 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of 
Appeals' decision for correctness; the correctness of the 
Court of Appeals' decision turns on whether that court 
correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
appropriate standard of review. 
12] Criminal Law €=>1134(3) 
110k 1134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Whether the trial co urt strictly complied with rule 
governing pleas is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11. 
131 Criminal Law €==>273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
The purpose of the rule governing pleas is to ensure that 
defendants know their rights and understand the basic 
consequences of their decision to plead guilty. Rules 
Crim.Proc, Rule 11. 
I £ Criminal Law €=^273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Plea affidavits or plea statements are properly used and 
incorporated into the record when the trial court 
determines that the defendant has read the affidavit or 
statement, understands its contents, and acknowledges 
those contents; proper incorporation of plea affidavits 
can save the court time, eliminate some of the 
monotony of rote recitation, and allow a more focused 
inquiry into the facts of the offense and whether the 
plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
151 Criminal Law €==>274(2) 
110k274(2) Most Cited Cases 
Withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a right, 
that is left to the trial court's sound discretion. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-13-6(2)(a). 
161 Criminal Law €=^1149 
110k! 149 Most Cited Cases 
Appellate courts will not disturb a trial court's 
determination that a defendant has failed to show good 
cause for withdrawal of his guilty plea unless it is clear 
that the trial court has abused its discretion. 
U.C.A.1953. 77-13-6(2)(a). 
HI Criminal Law €=>1134(2) 
110k! 134(2) Most Cited Cases 
When reviewing the trial court's denial of defendant's 
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motion to withdraw guilty plea, reviewing court may 
consider record of plea proceedings, including plea 
colloquy and plea affidavit or statement; thus, review of 
denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea is not limited 
to denial of motion itself. 
M Criminal Law €^1134(2) 
110k! 134(2) Most Cited Cases 
Appellate review of the trial court's denial of a 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea may 
consider the facts and circumstances in which the plea 
was taken. 
121 Criminal Law €^>1030(2) 
110k 103 0(2) Most Cited Cases 
In general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, 
including constitutional arguments, raised for the first 
time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain 
error or the case involves exceptional circumstances. 
1101 Criminal Law €=^1030(1) 
110kl030q) Most Cited Cases 
A proper objection puts the judge on notice of the 
asserted error and allows the opportunity for correction 
at that time in the course of the proceeding. 
fill Criminal Law €=>1030(1) 
110kl030q) Most Cited Cases 
[111 Criminal Law €^>1130(5) 
1 lQkl 130(5) Most Cited Cases 
An issue must be sufficiently raised to a level of 
consciousness before the trial court and must be 
supported by evidence or relevant legal authority in 
order for it to be considered on appeal. 
[121 Criminal Law €^>1030(1) 
110kl030(l) Most Cited Cases 
Failure to raise and argue an issue and present pertinent 
evidence in the trial court denies the trial court the 
opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions 
of law concerning the claimed error. 
1131 Criminal Law €=^1030(4) 
110k 103 0(4) Most Cited Cases 
1131 Criminal Law €=>1043(2) 
110k 1043 (2) Most Cited Cases 
[131 Criminal Law €=>1130(5) 
110k 1130(5) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review issue 
of whether trial court's alleged failure to comply with 
rule governing pleas required grant of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea; defendant did not sufficiently 
bring issue to trial court's attention in his motion to 
withdraw, nor was it supported by evidence or relevant 
legal authority, but, instead, defendant vaguely asserted 
that there were "two significant departures" from due 
process and equal protection. 
[141 Criminal Law €==>1030(1) 
110kl03Q(l) Most Cited Cases 
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish 
that (1) an error exists, (2) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful, 
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for the appellant; if any one 
of these requirements is not met, plain error is not 
established. 
[151 Criminal Law <€>==>273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
No obvious error resulted from trial court's statement to 
defendant during plea colloquy that he had right to a 
"trial by jury" rather than "a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury," as set forth in rule governing pleas, 
given that law in this area was not sufficiently clear or 
plainly settled such as to have adequately guided trial 
court at time defendant's plea of guilty to child abuse 
and assault was entered. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11. 
[161 Criminal Law €=>1030(1) 
110k 103 0(1) Most Cited Cases 
To establish that error should have been obvious to the 
trial court, defendant must show that the law governing 
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the error was clear at the time the alleged error was 
made. 
[171 Criminal Law €^>1030(1) 
110k 103Ofl) Most Cited Cases 
Under the plain error doctrine, defendant must not only 
demonstrate that the error was obvious, but also that it 
was harmful or of such a magnitude that there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the defendant; this harmfulness test is equivalent to the 
prejudice test applied in assessing claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
[181 Criminal Law €=^641.13(5) 
110k641.13(5) Most Cited Cases 
Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial; thus, counsel's deficient performance 
must have affected the outcome of the plea process. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
[191 Criminal Law €^>641.13(5) 
110k641.13(5) Most Cited Cases 
Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, establishing harm 
generally requires the defendant's assertion that "but 
for" the alleged error, he would not have pled guilty. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
[201 Criminal Law €^>1031(4) 
110k 1031(4) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant failed to allege that trial court's statement to 
defendant during plea colloquy that he had right to a 
"trial by jury" rather than "a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury," as set forth in rule governing pleas, 
prejudiced him in any way, as necessary for him to 
establish plain error, in prosecution for child abuse and 
assault. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 11. 
*277 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeanne B. Inouye, 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, David E.Doxev, Cedar 
City, for petitioner. 
J. Bryan Jackson, Cedar City, for respondent. 
*278 AMENDED OPINION 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
1f 1 Wallace Wayne Dean pled guilty to two counts of 
child abuse and one count of assault. Dean later sought 
to withdraw his plea, claiming the trial judge had not 
strictly complied with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(e). The trial court denied Dean's motion. Dean 
appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The case is 
now before us on a writ of certiorari. We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
K 2 On March 8, 2000, Dean pled guilty to two counts 
of child abuse and one count of assault. fFNll These 
charges stemmed from incidents of abuse and assault 
involving Dean's two children and his now deceased 
wife. In exchange for Dean's guilty plea, other pending 
charges were dismissed. 
FN1. See State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 
57P.3d 1106, for a more detailed description 
of the facts. 
\ 3 In connection with his plea, Dean executed a plea 
statement detailing the constitutional rights he was 
waiving. The plea statement declared, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
I, Wallace Wayne Dean ... under oath, hereby 
acknowledge that I have entered a plea of "guilty" to 
the offense(s) of Child Abuse (Count I), ... Child 
Abuse (Count III), ... and Assault (Count V).... I 
farther understand the charge[s] to which this plea of 
"guilty" is entered ... and that I am entering such a 
plea voluntarily and of my own free will, after 
conferring with my Attorney... and with a knowledge 
and understanding of the following facts: 
I know that I have constitutional rights under the 
Constitutions of Utah and the United States to plead 
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not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge [s] 
to which I have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial 
by the Court should I elect to waive a trial by jury. I 
know I have a right to be represented by counsel and 
that I am in fact represented by ... my attorney. 
I know that if I wish to have a trial in Court upon the 
charge[s], I have a right to confront the witnesses 
against me.... I also know that I have the right to have 
witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense to 
testify in Court on my behalf and that I could, if I 
elected to do so, testify in Court on my own behalf, 
and that if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will 
be told that this may not be held against me if I 
choose to have the jury so instructed. 
I know that if I were to have a trial that the State must 
prove each and every element of the crime [s] charged 
to the satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt; ... and that any verdict by a jury... 
must be by a unanimous agreement of all jurors. 
I know that ... I have a right against 
self-incrimination. 
I know that if I wish to contest the charge[s] against 
me, I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will 
be set for trial.... I know and understand that by 
entering a plea of "guilty," I am waiving my 
constitutional rights ... and that I am, in fact, fully 
incriminating myself by admitting I am guilty of the 
crime[s] to which my plea of "guilty" is entered. 
1f 4 Dean signed the plea statement and initialed each 
paragraph. The following oral exchange took place 
between Dean and the court at the time he signed the 
statement: 
The Court: All right. So are these your initials by 
each of the 16 paragraphs? 
Mr. Dean: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Did you place them there after you first 
read each and all paragraphs? 
Mr. Dean: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Are you in agreement with what your 
attorney just said regarding what's written here, 
handwriting? 
Mr. Dean: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Okay. What is your plea to Count I child 
abuse, sex abuse? 
Mr. Dean: Guilty plea. 
The Court: Count III, child abuse, a Class A 
second-degree misdemeanor? 
*279Mr. Dean: Guilty plea. 
The Court: Count V, assault, a Class B 
misdemeanor? 
Mr. Dean: Guilty. 
U 5 Approximately one month later, on April 10,2000, 
Dean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, stating 
that the plea was not taken pursuant to rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Dean did not 
specify the basis for the violation. Instead, he merely 
alleged that there were "two significant departures" 
from due process and equal protection, without further 
explanation. 
K 6 The next day, the court denied Dean's motion to 
withdraw and imposed sentence, concluding that Dean 
had failed to show good cause for withdrawal of his 
guilty plea. Dean appealed and argued for the first time 
before the court of appeals that the trial court 
committed plain error by not advising him of his right 
to a "speedy public trial before an impartial jury." 
(Emphasis added.) The court of appeals reversed the 
trial court's denial of Dean's motion to withdraw and 
vacated his conviction, concluding that failure to 
include the words "speedy" and "impartial" as part of 
the plea colloquy constituted plain error. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ri1T2117 On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' 
decision for correctness. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Wall 1999 UT 33, IT 4, 978 P.2d 460. The correctness 
of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that 
court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under 
the appropriate standard of review. Newspaper Agency 
Corp. v. Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266,267 (Utah 1997). 
Whether the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 is 
a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, % 10, 983 P.2d 556. 
ANALYSIS 
I. RULE 11 
\ 8 Dean argues that he is entitled to withdraw his 
guilty plea because the trial court failed to strictly 
comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
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Procedure. The State counters that Dean's motion to 
withdraw was properly denied by the trial court. 
Moreover, the State argues that appellate review of a 
trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw 
is limited to the denial of the motion itself. Therefore, 
the State asserts that we must limit our review to the 
denial of Dean's motion to withdraw and should not 
consider the record of the plea proceedings, the plea 
colloquy, or the plea statement. 
[3] If 9 Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 Ue) states, 
in relevant part, that a court may not accept a guilty 
plea until the court has found that "the defendant knows 
of ... the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury." Utah R.Crim. P. 1 Ue). The purpose of 
rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know their rights 
and understand the basic consequences of their decision 
to plead guilty. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f^ 11, 22 
P.3d 1242. However, we have also declared that this 
purpose "should not be overshadowed or undermined 
by formalistic ritual." Id. Moreover, while in State v. 
Thurman, 911 P.2d 3 71,3 72 (Utah 1996), we described 
the trial court's duty in this regard as a duty of "strict 
compliance," we have also declared that strict 
compliance " 'does not mandate a particular script or 
rote recitation of the rights listed.'" State v. Martinez, 
2001 UT 12,1122,26 P.3d 203 (quoting Visser, 2000 
UT 88 atlf 11,22 P.3d 1242). 
[4[ K 10 Plea affidavits or plea statements are properly 
used and incorporated into the record when the trial 
court determines that the defendant has read the 
affidavit or statement, understands its contents, and 
acknowledges those contents. State v. Maguire, 830 
P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991) (per curiam). Proper 
incorporation of plea affidavits can save the court time, 
eliminate some of the monotony of rote recitation, and 
allow a more focused inquiry into the facts of the 
offense and whether the plea is knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. Mazuire, 830 P.2d at 217-18: 
Utah R.Crim. P. 11 advisory committee note. 
f5"lf61 f 11 At the time defendant filed his motion to 
withdraw, a guilty plea could only be withdrawn upon 
good cause shown and *280 with leave of the court. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6(2)(a) (1999). Withdrawal 
"is a privilege, not a right, that is left to the trial court's 
sound discretion." State v. Gallezos, 738 P.2d 1040, 
1041 (Utah 1987): State v. Brocksmith 888 P.2d 703, 
704 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Therefore, appellate courts 
will not disturb a trial court's determination that a 
defendant has failed to show good cause unless it is 
clear that the trial court has abused its discretion. State 
v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, If 9, 1 P.3d 1108. 
r71T81|12 When reviewing the trial court's denial of a 
defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the 
reviewing court may consider the record of the plea 
proceedings, including the plea colloquy and plea 
affidavit or statement. Visser, 2000 UT 88 at Iff? 4-5, 
12, 22 P.3d 1242: Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (stating 
that compliance may be demonstrated on appeal by 
reference to the record of the plea proceedings). Thus, 
review of a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw 
is not limited to the denial of the motion itself. The 
precedent in both the Utah and federal courts 
demonstrates that courts consistently consider the plea 
colloquy in reviewing the denial of a defendant's motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea. United States v. Vonn, 535 
U.S. 55. 59, 122 S.Ct 1043. 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002): 
Visser, 2000 UT 88 at f 4. 22 P.3d 1242. Moreover, 
appellate review of the trial court's denial of a 
defendant's motion to withdraw may also consider the 
facts and circumstances in which the plea was taken. 
See Visser, 2000 UT 88 at If 13. 22 P.3d 1242 (stating 
the trial court's colloquy, "in light of the mid-trial 
context of the plea," provided an adequate basis to 
conclude that the trial court had complied with rule 11). 
f9iriQiriliri21 % 13 Finally, in general, appellate 
courts will not consider an issue, including 
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on 
appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or 
the case involves exceptional circumstances. State v. 
Holsate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346. A proper 
objection "puts the judge on notice of the asserted error 
and allows the opportunity for correction at that time in 
the course of the proceeding." Broberg v. Hess, 782 
P.2d 198.201 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). Moreover, the issue 
must be "sufficiently raised to a 'level of consciousness' 
before the trial court and must be supported by 
evidence or relevant legal authority." State v. Schultz, 
2002 UT A P P 366. 11 19. 58 P.3d 879 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). Failure to raise and 
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argue an issue and present pertinent evidence in that 
forum denies the trial court " 'the opportunity to make 
any findings of fact or conclusions of law'" concerning 
the claimed error. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 
(quoting LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enter., 823 P.2d 
479, 483 n. 6 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). 
[1311f 14 In this case, Dean's argument that the trial 
court failed to comply with rule 11 was not properly 
preserved below. Dean's motion to withdraw and the 
asserted grounds therefor failed to put the trial court on 
notice of the alleged error. Dean did not sufficiently 
bring the issue to the court's attention in his motion to 
withdraw, nor was it supported by evidence or relevant 
legal authority. Instead, Dean vaguely asserted that 
there were "two significant departures" from due 
process and equal protection. He did not indicate what 
those departures were, denying the trial court the 
opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Therefore, we can only address this argument 
under a plain error analysis. In conducting this 
analysis, we will consider the record of the plea 
proceedings, the plea statement, and the plea colloquy. 
II. PLAIN ERROR 
ri4iri51 f 15 To demonstrate plain error, a defendant 
must establish that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant." Holsate, 2000 UT 74 at f 13, 10 P.3d 
346 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993)). "If any one of these requirements is not 
met, plain error is not established." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1209 (citations omitted). 
A. Obvious Error 
ri61 Tf 16 We turn first to the element of obviousness. 
To establish that the error *281 should have been 
obvious to the trial court, Dean must show that the law 
governing the error was clear at the time the alleged 
error was made. See State v. Eldredze, 113 P.2d 29, 
35-36 (Utah 1989) (rejecting a claim of plain error 
where a dispositive appellate case had not yet been 
decided); see also State v. Ross. 951 P.2d 236, 239 
(Utah Ct.App.1997) (stating "error is not plain where 
there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court"). 
If 17 In this context and on these facts, we find that any 
error committed by the trial court was not obvious at 
the time the court denied Dean's motion to withdraw. 
First, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion 
that the trial court's alleged error should have been 
obvious in light of the decisions in State v. 
Tarnawiecki, 2000UT App 186,5 P.3d 1222, andSfofe 
V, Hittle. 2002 UT App 134. 47 P.3d 101. As the 
dissent in the court of appeals' decision pointed out, 
both of these cases were decided after Dean pled guilty 
and made his motion to withdraw. Dean entered his 
guilty plea on March 8,2000, and sought its withdrawal 
on April 10, 2000; however, the Tarnawiecki and 
Hittle opinions were not issued until June 15,2000, and 
April 25, 2002, respectively. Therefore, neither 
decision was available to guide the trial court at the 
time of Dean's plea or when it considered his motion to 
withdraw. 
\ 18 Second, the law in this area was not sufficiently 
clear or plainly settled. This was true with respect to 
both Utah and federal case law. In Visser, we held that 
the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 even 
though it did not specifically inform the defendant of 
his "right to a speedy public trial before an impartial 
jury." 2000 UT 88 at f 13, 22 P.3d 1242. Taking into 
account the context of the plea, we held that because the 
trial court's colloquy provided an adequate basis to 
conclude that the rule 11 requirements had been 
fulfilled, the court's omission of the words "speedy" and 
"impartial" did not justify withdrawal of the defendant's 
plea. Id. 
K 19 In addition, federal law in this area was not 
well-settled, and some federal courts have held that 
exclusion of a specific word in the plea colloquy does 
not always constitute error sufficient to justify 
withdrawal. See United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d 
491, 493 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Burnett, 671 
F.2d 709, 711-12 (2d Cir.1982) (failure to inform the 
defendant of the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against him was not proper justification for 
withdrawal of defendant's guilty plea). 
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If 20 The defendant in Rubalcaba, for example, was 
advised that by pleading guilty he was waiving his 
"rightto trial." Id at493 (emphasis added). However, 
rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires that the court "inform the defendant of, and 
determine that the defendant understands... the right to 
y'ury trial." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(emphasisadded). 
The defendant argued that because the trial court failed 
to include the word "jury" when describing his rule 11 
rights, he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty 
plea. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d at 493. The appellate court 
disagreed and found the trial court's statement that the 
defendant was waiving his right to "trial" rather than 
"jury trial" was not a fair and just reason to permit the 
defendant's withdrawal of his plea.M at 493. 
H 21 As Visser and Rubalcaba demonstrate, the law in 
this area was not plainly settled so as to have adequately 
guided the trial court at the time Dean's plea was 
entered. It was not clear that the omission of particular 
words during plea colloquies constituted obvious error 
and justification for a defendant to withdraw his or her 
plea. We therefore hold that the trial court's statement 
that Dean had the right to a "trial by jury" rather than "a 
speedy public trial before an impartial jury" was not 
obvious error. 
B. Harmful Error 
ri7iri8iri91 f 22 Under the plain error doctrine, a 
defendant must not only demonstrate that the error was 
obvious, but also that it was harmful or "of such a 
magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the defendant." State v. 
Evans, 2001 UT 22,If16, 20 P.3d 888; Hoteate, 2000 
UT 74 at 11 13, 10P.3d346. This harmfulness test is 
equivalent to the prejudice test applied in assessing 
claims of *282 ineffective assistance of counsel. State 
v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, If 10, 4 P.3d 778. "Where a 
defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show 
a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, 
he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial.' " Parsons v. Barnes, 
871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 
203 (1985)). Therefore, counsel's deficient 
performance must have "affected the outcome of the 
plea process." Id. Similarly, establishing harm in the 
present context generally requires the defendant's 
assertion that "but for" the alleged error, he or she 
would not have pled guilty. See State v. Martinez, 2001 
UT 12, f 17, 26 P.3d 203 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). 
T201 f^ 23 In the instant case, Dean has never asserted 
that the trial court's alleged error prejudiced him in any 
way. Dean argues that "[sjince a right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury is a substantial 
constitutional right, the need to make a separate finding 
of harm is unnecessary and presumed to be harmful if 
the trial court fails to inform a defendant accordingly." 
We disagree, and hold that Dean was required to show 
that any error by the court actually "affected the 
outcome of the plea process." Parsons, 871 P.2d at 
525. Dean did not argue that but for the court's 
omission of the words "speedy" and "impartial" he 
would not have pled guilty and would have gone to 
trial. Therefore, he has failed to satisfy the third 
element of plain error analysis. See State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (stating where harm is 
not shown, plain error is not established). 
CONCLUSION 
K 24 Having concluded that Dean failed to establish 
either that any error by the trial court was obvious or 
that he was harmed by any such error, we decline to 
find plain error. JFN2] We reverse the court of appeals 
and affirm the trial court's denial of Dean's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
FN2. Our holding is not intended to 
undermine our consistent emphasis on 
compliance with rule 11 in all plea 
proceedings. See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 
371, 372-73 (Utah 1996): State v. Gibbons. 
740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). The plea 
statement used in this case requires review and 
the words "speedy" and "impartial" should be 
added to remove any possibility of future 
challenges resembling the one currently before 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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us. Likewise, trial judges should be attentive 
to the nuances of rule 1 l's language as they 
use and rely on plea statements. The 
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty 
Plea, found as Form 1 in the Appendix of 
Forms to the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, will M[w]hen properly filled out" 
comprise a "statement for purposes of strict 
compliance with Rule 11 r.l" Utah R.Crim. P., 
Appendix of Forms (2003). 
f 25 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice 
DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING 
concur in Chief Justice DURHAM'S opinion. 
95 P.3d 276, 505 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT 63 
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Carolyn Roberts MANNING, Petitioner and 
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April 1, 2004. 
Background: Petitioner moved for postconviction 
relief. The Third District, Salt Lake Department, Judith 
S. Atherton, denied the motion. Petitioner appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: 
(1) a petitioner seeking to challenge the validity of her 
convictions may not circumventthe requirements of the 
Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) by styling her 
petition as one filed under the rule governing 
extraordinary relief; 
(2) petitioner could not demonstrate that her right to 
appeal conviction based upon her guilty plea was 
denied; 
(3) petitioner's time for appeal from conviction based 
on guilty plea could not have been extended; 
(4) even assuming post-conviction relief petitioner was 
given incomplete information regarding the nature of 
her right to appeal, she was aware of limited time within 
which she was required to appeal; and 
(5) alleged failure of petitioner's trial counsel to advise 
petitioner about specific details of her limited right to 
appeal from conviction based on guilty plea did not 
constitute ineffective assistance. 
Affirmed. 
110k! 134(10) Most Cited Cases 
Generally, an appeal from a judgment on a petition for 
post-conviction relief raises questions of law reviewed 
for correctness, on which the Court of Appeals gives no 
deference to the post-conviction court's conclusion. 
121 Criminal Law €=^>1134(3) 
110k 1134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Interpretation of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
presents questions of law, which the Court of Appeals 
reviews for correctness and without deference to the 
lower court's conclusion. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 65B, 
65C. 
131 Criminal Law €=^1069(6) 
110k 1069(6) Most Cited Cases 
If an appeal is not timely filed, the Court of Appeals 
lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Rules App.Proc, 
Rule 4(a). 
J41 Criminal Law €==>1069(5) 
110k 1069(5) Most Cited Cases 
[41 Sentencing and Punishment C=?2221 
350Hk2221 Most Cited Cases 
141 Sentencing and Punishment €=?2250 
350Hk2250 Most Cited Cases 
In circumstances where the right to appeal has been 
denied, the trial court may resentence a criminal 
defendant nunc pro tunc to provide the defendant with 
an opportunity to file a timely appeal. 
151 Courts €^>207.1 
106k207.1 Most Cited Cases 
West Headnotes 
[j 1 Criminal Law €^>1134(10) 
Because the postconviction relief rule governs 
proceedings filed under the Post Conviction Remedies 
Act (PCRA), which is the governing statute for any 
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a 
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criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal 
remedies, the civil rule governing extraordinary relief 
is not applicable in a challenge focused on a criminal 
conviction, even if a restriction on liberty results from 
the conviction. U.C.A.1953, 78- 35a-102(l), Rules 
Civ.Proc. Rules 65B, 65C. 
£61 Courts €=^207.1 
106k207.1 Most Cited Cases 
The plain language of the state rules of civil procedure 
demonstrates the distinction between a petition for 
postconviction relief, which is governed by the civil 
rule on postconviction relief, and a petition for 
wrongful restraint on personal liberty, which is 
governed by the civil rule on extraordinary relief, and 
a petitioner seeking to challenge the validity of her 
convictions may not circumvent the requirements of the 
Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) by styling her 
petition as one filed under the rule governing 
extraordinary relief; such petitioners must proceed 
under the PCRA and the civil rule on postconviction 
relief. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 65B, 65C. 
121 Criminal Law €=^1426(2) 
110k 1426(2) Most Cited Cases 
Though postconviction relief may have its roots in the 
ancient writ of habeas corpus, it does not follow that the 
two may be used interchangeably, especially given the 
subsequent enactment of the Post Conviction Remedies 
Act (PCRA). Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 65B, 65C. 
181 Statutes €=>206 
361k2Q6 Most Cited Cases 
The Court of Appeals seeks to render all parts of a 
statute relevant and meaningful, and it avoids 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute 
superfluous or inoperative. 
191 Criminal Law €=>1026.10(2.1) 
HOkl026.10(2.1) Most Cited Cases 
121 Criminal Law €^1026.10(3) 
110kl026.10(3) Most Cited Cases 
Page 2 
Post-conviction relief petitioner could not demonstrate 
that her right to appeal conviction based upon her guilty 
plea was denied; record did not support her claim that 
she was given incomplete advice regarding 
consequences of guilty plea and limited right to appeal, 
as her plea affidavit stated she understood she was 
waiving her right to appeal, trial judge told her that her 
right to appeal was very limited, and she was told she 
had 30 days to withdraw her guilty plea, which she 
never sought to do. 
HOI Criminal Law €=^273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
HOI Criminal Law €=>1026.10(3) 
110kl026.10(3) Most Cited Cases 
Once defendant has been given sufficient information to 
allow court to find that defendant has been advised of 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw his or her 
plea and has been advised that the right of appeal is 
limited, it is up to the defendant to exercise the right. 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 1 l(e)(7. 8). 
fill Criminal Law €==>1081(6) 
110kl081(6) Most Cited Cases 
Post-conviction relief petitioner's time for appeal from 
conviction based on guilty plea could not have been 
extended under rule providing that trial court, upon 
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, could 
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, since 
petitioner did not file a motion pursuant to rule and 
there was no showing of excusable neglect or good 
cause that would have given trial court discretion to 
extend time for filing appeal. Rules App.Proc, Rule 
4(e). 
[121 Criminal Law €^>273.1(4) 
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases 
Accused. 
Even assuming post-conviction relief petitioner was 
given incomplete information regarding the nature of 
her right to appeal from conviction based on guilty plea, 
she was aware that there was a limited time frame 
within which she could seek to withdraw her plea, and 
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she did not seek to do so. 
[131 Criminal Law €^>1026.10(3) 
110kl026.10(3) Most Cited Cases 
A defendant cannot simply appeal a conviction based 
on a guilty plea, but must first file a motion to withdraw 
the plea, giving the court who took the plea the first 
chance to consider defendant's arguments. 
[141 Criminal Law €==>641.13(5) 
110k641.13(5) Most Cited Cases 
[14] Criminal Law €=^641.13(7) 
110k641.13(7) Most Cited Cases 
Alleged failure of post-conviction relief petitioner's trial 
counsel to advise petitioner about specific details of her 
limited right to appeal from conviction based on guilty 
plea did not constitute ineffective assistance; attorney 
stated at plea hearing that petitioner had participated in 
preparation of plea statement, petitioner had stated that 
attorney adequately and properly served her, she did not 
request an appeal, and she met several times with her 
attorney after sentencing, during which she could have 
aired any dissatisfaction with sentence or interest in 
appealing. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6. 
*198 Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General and Laura B. 
Dupaix. Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee. 
Before Judges BILLINGS. DAVIS, and ORME. 
OPINION 
ORME. Judge: 
f 1 Carolyn Manning appeals the trial court's denial of 
her petition for postconviction relief, which was 
brought over a year after she entered her guilty pleas. 
She contends that because she was not fully informed 
by her counsel and the trial court of the nature of her 
Page 3 
right to appeal, the trial court's refusal to resentence her 
constitutes a denial of her constitutional right to appeal. 
We affirm the trial court's denial of her motion and 
clarify the procedures for attacking guilty pleas and the 
availability of resentencing as a means to cure a missed 
opportunity to appeal. 
BACKGROUND 
% 2 Manning was originally charged with three counts 
of unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, one 
count of failure to render a proper tax return, and two 
counts of theft by deception. Under the terms of a plea 
agreement, Manning pled guilty to one count of 
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, a second 
degree felony; one count of failing to file a proper tax 
return, a third degree felony; and one count of theft, a 
third degree felony. The agreement also called for 
Manning to pay restitution to her victims. In exchange, 
the State agreed to dismiss the other counts. 
f 3 In her written plea statement and at the plea 
hearing, Manning acknowledged that by entering a 
guilty plea she was waiving certain rights, including her 
right to appeal the conviction. In July 2001, she signed 
a statement, which she had reviewed with counsel, 
confirming that she intended to enter a guilty plea. The 
statement explained each of her rights that would be 
waived by voluntarily entering a guilty plea, including 
that the "right of appeal is limited." In *199 contrast, if 
she "were tried and convicted by a jury or by a judge, 
[she] would have the right to appeal [her] conviction 
and sentence." The statement further explained that by 
pleading guilty she was "not preserving any issue for 
appeal relative to the Court's rulings on pre-trial 
motions or based upon statutory or constitutional 
challenges" and that she understood that by pleading 
guilty she waived her "rights to file an appeal." The 
statement also provided notice of the "time limits for 
withdrawing pleas" and indicated that such a request 
"must be made by motion within 30 days after the entry 
of the plea" [FN 11 and that the plea may be withdrawn 
only "upon a showing of good cause and with leave of 
the Court." 
FN1. This statement was made just weeks 
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before issuance of the Utah Supreme Court's 
opinion in State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 
P.3d 528, which held "that the thirty-day 
limitation on the filing of a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest runs 
from the date of final disposition of the case at 
the district court," id. at If 11, rather than from 
the time of entry of the plea. 
If 4 At the plea hearing in July 2001, Manning was 
represented by counsel, and the trial court engaged her 
in a colloquy before accepting her plea. During the 
course of the colloquy, the court determined that 
Manning understood the proceedings against her and 
was competent to enter a guilty plea. Her attorney 
stated that she is "a bright lady" who was "educated 
through the 15th grade" and that she had "participated 
in the preparation o f the written plea statement. 
Manning stated that her attorney had "taken the time to 
extend himself to adequately and properly serve me, 
and I'm satisfied with his service." The court explained 
that the "third degree felonies may carry with them an 
indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison of zero to 
five years"; "[t]he second degree felony can carry with 
it an indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison of one 
to fifteen years"; and "there is a substantial amount of 
restitution that will be ordered." The court reviewed 
with Manning the trial rights she would forego by 
pleading guilty and stated that her "right to appeal these 
pleas of guilty is very limited." After accepting her 
guilty pleas, the court informed her of her right to file 
a motion to withdraw the pleas within 30 days. 
If 5 On September 27,2001, Manning was sentenced to 
the statutory term of imprisonment for each offense, 
which prison terms were suspended except for one year, 
and she was given credit for time already served, which 
was approximately four months. She was placed on 
probation for thirty-six months and was ordered to pay 
restitution in the tentative amount of $210,000 to her 
individual victims and $ 19,431.24 to the Utah State Tax 
Commission. At sentencing, defense counsel indicated 
that he had "spoken to Ms. Manning about the real 
probability that [incarceration] was going to happen." 
\ 6 On November 23, 2001, Manning filed a pro se 
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notice of appeal, which this court later dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction. In an unpublished decision, this 
court explained that when a notice of appeal is filed 
beyond the 30-day appeal deadline, see UtahR.App. P. 
4(a), we lack appellate jurisdiction, and Manning's only 
remedy if she was deprived of the right to appeal was to 
seek postconviction relief under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
f 7 On July 31, 2002, Manning filed a petition in the 
district court "pursuant to Rule 65Bfb) and/or 65C [of 
the] Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an extraordinary 
writ allowing her to be sentenced nunc pro tunc ... 
thereby extending the time in which to file a notice of 
appeal." Her primary claim was that her right to appeal 
and right to counsel had "been violated by the failure to 
file a timely notice of appeal from her conviction." The 
district court denied her petition for postconviction 
relief, finding that Manning "was informed by the court 
of her limited right to appeal," "was represented by very 
competent counsel," and had "not established that she 
was unconst itutionally denied her right to appeal." 
Manning now appeals that ruling. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
nif"21 U 8 Manning argues that the trial court "erred in 
refusing to resentence her nunc pro tunc." She contends 
that she "was deprived of her constitutional right to 
appeal" and "was also deprived of the right to *200 
counsel during the period for perfecting an appeal." 
"Generally, an appeal from a judgment on a petition for 
post-conviction relief raises questions of law reviewed 
for correctness, [on which we give] no deference to the 
post-conviction court's conclusion." Wickham v. 
Galetka. 2002 UT 72,f 7, 61 P.3d 978. Accord 
Moench v. State, 2002 UT ADD 333, If 4, 57 P.3d 1116. 
Likewise, interpretation of the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, rule 65C, and rule 65B "present[ ] 
question[s] of law, which we also review for correctness 
and without deference to the lower court's conclusion." 
Moench 2002 UT ADD 333 at If 5. 57 P.3d 1116. See 
Platts v. Parents Helyim Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 
(Utah 1997) (stating that "matters of statutory 
construction are questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness"). 
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ANALYSIS 
mr41 If 9 The Utah Constitution provides that "[i]n 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
... appeal in all cases." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the right of appeal 
[is] essential to a fair criminal proceeding" and it cannot 
be "lightly forfeited." State v. Tuttle. 713 P.2d 703, 
704 (Utah 1985). However, appeals must be filed 
"within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment 
or order appealed from." Utah R.App. P. 4(a). It is 
well established that "[i]f an appeal is not timely filed, 
this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal." Serrato 
v. Utah Transit Auth. 2000 UT App 299.11 7. 13 P.3d 
616, cert, denied, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001). The Utah 
Supreme Court has warned that extraordinary writs 
"must not" be used to "make a mockery of the time 
limits for appeal, undermine the finality of criminal 
judgments, and promote the indefensible 
merry-go-round of collateral attack." Bozzess v. 
Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981). Nonetheless, in 
circumstances where the right to appeal has been 
denied, the trial court may resentence a criminal 
defendant nunc pro tunc to provide the defendant with 
an opportunity to file a timely appeal. See id_ (granting 
extraordinary relief where petitioner requested that 
counsel pursue an appeal but counsel failed to file a 
notice of appeal); State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 
(Utah 1981). TFN21 Manning contends it was error for 
the lower court to refuse to resentence her. 
FN2. As aptly stated in State v. Johnson, 635 
P.2d36(Utah 1981), "[n]unc pro tunc, which 
means 'now for then,' is probably a misnomer 
for this circumstance, where the court is 
resentencing to give the judgment of 
conviction not retroactive but present effect." 
Id. at 38 n. 1. Although Johnson suggests 
changing the terminology to "tunc pro nunc," 
id, perhaps it is less confusing to forego the 
quest for the perfect Latin phrase and simply 
describe the requested action as 
"resentencing." 
I. Resentencing 
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[^ 10 Utah cases have recognized that in certain limited 
circumstances a defendant should be resentenced in 
order to revive the right to appeal. In State v. Johnson, 
635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), the criminal defendant 
claimed that his attorney agreed to file a notice of 
appeal after sentencing, but the attorney failed to follow 
through. See id. at 37. Having learned of the first 
attorney's failure, the defendant contacted a second 
attorney while still within the 30-day period for filing 
an appeal, "but through some misunderstanding" a 
timely appeal was not filed. Id_ The Court denied the 
defendant's request to extend the time for filing because 
"[t]he 30-day period ... is jurisdictional and cannot be 
enlarged" but explained that due to the "important 
interests involved," which made "further proceedings 
desirable," the trial court could take evidence to 
determine whether the defendant's constitutional right 
to appeal the conviction had been denied. Id_ The 
Court stated that "[i]f the facts alleged by the defendant 
are true ... defendant was denied a constitutional right 
and must be provided an opportunity to take a direct 
appeal from his conviction." Id. at 38. As the remedy 
for such a denial, the Court adopted the resentencing 
procedure described in People v. Callaway, 24 N. Y.2d 
127, 299 N.Y.S.2d 154, 247 N.E.2d 128, 130 
(N.Y.I969), whereby the act of resentencing starts a 
new 30-day period for filing an appeal. See Johnson, 
635P.2dat38. 
| 11 Similarly, in Bozzess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 
(Utah 1981), the defendant filed a notice of appeal 
almost seven months after *201 he was sentenced, 
claiming, among other things, ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See id. at 40. "After his conviction and again 
at the time of his sentencing, defendant advised his 
appointed counsel that he did not want to appealf, but 
ajfter he arrived at the state prison, defendant changed 
his mind" and so advised his attorney. Id_ The Court 
determined that "[cjounsel erred in not filing the notice 
of appeal" because the defendant's letter asking his 
attorney to file an appeal reached the attorney the day 
before the expiration of the time for filing a notice of 
appeal. Id_ The Court stated that "[t]he error in this 
case goes to the availability of the appeal" and "[i]f the 
facts found by the [trial] court establish that the right to 
appeal was denied, that court is then empowered to 
resentence the defendant nunc pro tunc." Id. at 42-43. 
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II. Procedural Confusion 
If 12 There is widespread confusion about the exact 
procedure to be followed in cases like the instant one, 
where resentencing to resurrect the right to appeal is the 
objective, as typified by Manning's invocation of "Rule 
65B(b) and/or 65C [of the] Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." Given the recurring nature of this problem, 
we take the opportunity to illuminate the historical 
reasons for this confusion and to clarify the correct 
procedural approach. 
f 13 At the time that Johnson and Bozzess were 
decided, "[t]he appropriate remedy [was] amotion for 
relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
65B(i)," which authorized the trial court, "if it [found] 
in favor of the complainant, to 'enter an appropriate 
order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the 
former proceedings ... as the court may deem just and 
proper in the case.' " Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (third 
alteration in original) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(i)(8) (1977)). rFN31 The Utah Supreme Court 
explained that "[t]he postconviction hearing procedure 
is a successor to the common-law writ of error coram 
nobis." Id_ A writ of error coram nobis is "[a] writ of 
error directed to a court for review of its own judgment 
and predicated on alleged errors of fact." Black's Law 
Dictionary 338 (7th ed.1999). It can be distinguished 
from the more familiar writ of habeas corpus, which is 
"employed to bring a person before a court, most 
frequently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or 
detention is not illegal." Id. at 715. 
FN3. For clarity, we include the dates certain 
rules were adopted as we discuss the evolution 
of postconviction relief as dealt with in the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
[Coram nobis], which [the Utah Supreme Court] 
declared to be available in Utah in appropriate cases, 
Neal v. Beckstead 3 Utah 2d 403. 285 P.2d 129 
(1955), was used by a sentencing court to modify or 
vacate a judgment of conviction on the basis of facts 
which, without defendant's fault, did not appear on 
the face of the record and as to which defendant was 
without other remedy. State v. Gee, 30 Utah 2d 148, 
514 P.2d 809 (1973): Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 
85, 448 P.2d 907 (1968). Thus, coram nobis could 
be used, in carefully limited circumstances, to modify 
or vacate a judgment where extra-record facts 
showed that the defendant had been deprived of his 
constitutional right to a fair trial, including the right 
to the assistance of counsel. 
Johnson, 635P.2dat38. 
\ 14 Again, when Johnson and Bozzess were decided 
in 1981, rule 65B(i) governed postconviction relief in 
Utah. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i) (1977) (stating that 
"[a]ny person imprisoned... under a commitment of any 
court ... who asserts that in any proceedings which 
resulted in his commitment there was a substantial 
denial of his [constitutional] rights ... may institute a 
proceeding under this Rule"). Rule 65B was 
reorganized and revised in 1991, see Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B (1992) advisory committee note, so that 
postconviction relief was thereafter governed by rule 
65B(b). See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (1992) (stating that 
"[a]ny person committed by a court to imprisonment... 
who asserts that the commitment resulted from a 
substantial denial of rights may petition the court for 
relief under this paragraph"); Utah R. Civ. P. 65B 
(1992) advisory committee note (stating that 
"[pjaragraph (b) ... replaces subparagraph (i) of the 
former rule"). 
*202 III. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act and 
Rule 65C 
Tf 15 In 1996, as a result of coordinated efforts by all 
three branches of state government, the Legislature 
enacted the Post Conviction Remedies Act (the PCRA) 
and the Utah Supreme Court promulgatedrule_6^C. See 
Utah Code Ann. SS 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002); Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65C (Supp.1996 & 2003). Both became 
effective on July 1, 1996. The PCRA "establishes a 
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges 
a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who 
has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a 
direct appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(l) 
(2002). Under the PCRA, 
a person who has been convicted and sentenced for a 
criminal offense may file an action in the district 
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court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief 
to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon 
the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was 
imposed in violation of the United States Constitution 
or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is 
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner 
was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, 
or probation was revoked in an unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel 
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that 
requires the court to vacate the conviction or 
sentence.... 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-35a-104(l)(a)-(e) (2002). 
K 16 Sections 106 and 107 of the PCRA preclude relief 
in certain circumstances. "A person is not eligible for 
relief ... upon any ground that," among other things, 
"could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal," id § 78-35a-106(l)(c), unless "the failure to 
raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel." Id § 78-35a-106(2). Also, "[a] petitioner is 
entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one 
year after the cause of action has accrued," id. § 
78-35a-107(l), although "a court may excuse a 
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations" if 
it finds that "the interests of justice [so] require." TFN41 
Id §78-35a-107(3). 
FN4. The "interests of justice" escape valve 
alleviates the concern we expressed in Currier 
v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct.App.), 
cert denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994). In 
Currier, we struck down the former statute of 
limitations governing postconviction relief 
because it was "a rigid three-month limitation" 
that did not "include a provision excusing 
delay on the grounds of good cause." Id. at 
1368 & n. 18. At least partly in response to 
our decision in Currier, the Legislature 
enacted the current provision, lengthening the 
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time period to one year and adding the 
"interests of justice" exception, see Julian v. 
State. 966 P.2d 249, 251 n. 3 (Utah 1998), 
which, as we have previously held and affirm 
today, " 'must always [be] consider[ed] ... 
when a petitioner raises meritorious claims.'" 
Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 965 4, 976 P.2d 
100 (quoting Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849, 
851 (Utah 1998)(pluralitv opinion)) (emphasis 
in original). 
f 17 The PCRA also states that "[procedural 
provisions for filing and commencement of a petition 
are found in Rule 65C Tof the! Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." Utah Code Ann, g 78-35a-l 02(1) (2002). 
Rule 65C, entitled "Post-conviction relief," "replacefd] 
former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B," Utah R. Civ. P. 
65C (1997) advisory committee note, and now 
"govern[s] proceedings in all petitions for 
post-conviction relief filed under [the PCRA]." UtahR. 
Civ. P. 65C(a) (2003). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 65B 
(1997) advisory committee note (stating that "[t]he 
1996 amendment deleted former Subdivision (b)... the 
provisions of which have been transferred to Rule 
65C"); Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17,111 n. 1, 20 P.3d 
382 (noting that "rule 65B(b) was renumbered and is 
currently designated as rule 65C"). 
IV. Distinguishing Rule 65B 
£52 TI18 The basis upon which "a person may petition 
the court for extraordinary relief under rule 65B now 
only includes 
*203 any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) 
(involving wrongful restraint on personal liberty), 
paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public 
or corporate authority), or paragraph (d) (involving 
the wrongful use of judicial authority, the failure to 
exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) (2003). The use of rule 65B is 
limited to cases "[w]here no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy is available," and the scope of relief 
under paragraph (b) for "[w]rongfiil restraints on 
personal liberty," Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a)-(b), is now 
narrowed to "proceedings involving wrongful restraint 
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on personal liberty other than those governed by Rule 
65C." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (2003) advisory committee 
note (emphasis added). Therefore, because rule 65C 
governs proceedings filed under the PCRA, which is the 
governing statute for "any person who challenges a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who 
has exhausted all other legal remedies," Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-102(l), rule 65B is not applicable in a 
challenge focused on a criminal conviction, even if a 
restriction on liberty results from the conviction. 
£61 Tf 19 In addition, there is a very important 
procedural distinction between the two provisions: 
Petitioners alleging "[w]rongfiil restraint on personal 
liberty" under rule 65B(b) must "fil[e] a petition with 
the clerk of the court in the district in which [they are] 
restrained," Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2) (2003), while 
petitions for postconviction relief must be filed in "the 
district court in the county in which the judgment of 
conviction was entered." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b) 
(2003). 
r71T81 H 20 Thus, the plain language of our rules of 
civil procedure demonstrates the distinction between a 
petition for postconviction relief, which is governed by 
rule 65C, and a petition for wrongful restraint on 
personal liberty, which is governed by rule 65B(b), see 
Divoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61,11 11, 29 P.3d 1225 
(stating that courts should "look[ ] to the plain language 
of the applicable rule when construing it"), and we 
conclude that a petitioner seeking to challenge the 
validity of her conviction(s) may not circumvent the 
requirements of the PCRA by styling her petition as one 
filed under rule 65B(b). [FN51 Rather, *204 such 
petitioners must proceed under the PCRA and rule 65C. 
See Julian v. State, 2002 UT 615 4, 52 P.3d 1168 
(recognizing that "[t]he PCRA replaced prior 
post-conviction remedies with a statutory, 'substantive 
legal remedy for any person who challenges a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who 
has exhausted all other legal remedies'") (quoting Utah 
Code Ann, g 78-35a-102). A contrary holding would 
render rule 65C and the PCRA superfluous, and "we 
seek 'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and 
meaningful,1 and we 'avoid interpretations that will 
render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.' 
" State v Tooele County, 2002 UT 8,Tf 10,44 P.3d 680 
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(citations omitted). 
FN5. In so holding, we acknowledge that, 
prior to the enactment of the PCRA and rule 
65C, the Utah Supreme Court stated in dicta 
that " 'post-conviction proceedings' [are] a 
branch of habeas corpus" and that the two 
form a "single constitutional remedy." Hurst 
v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029.1033-34 (Utah 1989). 
In Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
P.2d 677 (Utah 1995). the Court explained: 
In its early history, a writ of habeas corpus 
was classically used to challenge the 
lawfulness of a physical restraint under which 
a person was held or the jurisdiction and 
sentence of a court that convicted a person.... 
Later, the scope of the writ was expanded to 
provide a post-conviction remedy in unusual 
circumstances to determine whether a person 
was convicted in violation of principles of 
fundamental fairness or whether the sentence 
imposed is void.... In addition, a writ of 
habeas corpus may be used to challenge cruel 
or oppressive conditions of imprisonment. 
Id at 681-82 (footnote omitted). See also 
Petersen v. Utah Bd of Pardons, 907 P.2d 
1148, 1153 &n. 2 (Utah 1995) ("A challenge 
to the authority of a governmental agency or 
officer to restrain a person's liberty is 
classically raised by a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.... It can also be used to 
challenge, for example, the terms and 
conditions of confmementf,] or, in certain 
cases, to challenge the authority of a private 
person to restrain the liberty of another."); 
Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1990) 
("The function of a writ of habeas corpus as a 
post-conviction remedy is to provide a means 
for collaterally attacking convictions when 
they are so constitutionally flawed that they 
result in fundamental unfairness and to 
provide for collateral attack of sentences not 
authorized by law."). 
Our decision today is not fundamentally 
inconsistent with Utah's pre-PCRA 
jurisprudence. Though postconviction relief 
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may have its roots in the ancient writ of 
habeas corpus, it does not follow that the two 
may be used interchangeably, especially given 
the subsequent enactment of the PCRA. See 
Spain v. Stewart 639 P.2d 166, 168 & n. 2 
(Utah 1981) (notifying that petitioner, who 
was charged but not convicted for possession 
of a controlled substance and was being held 
in county jail, properly challenged the legality 
of his restraint via rule 65B(f) (now rule 
65B(bX), which is "the traditional habeas 
corpus [procedure for] assuring that a person 
is not 'unjustly imprisoned or otherwise 
restrained of his liberty' "; thus, the 
"postconviction hearing provision [of rule] 
65B(D" (now rule 65C) did not apply); 
Litcerov. Warden, 841 P.2d 1230,1231 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992) (noting difference between rule 
65B(b) (now rule 65C) and rule 65B(c) (now 
rule65B(b)), and stating, "[b]ecause petitioner 
challenges the terms and conditions of his 
confinement, subparagraph (c) clearly 
applies"). Cf. Monson v. Slate, 953 P.2d 73, 
73-74 (Utah 1998) (stating that postconviction 
claims of defective plea colloquy and 
ineffective assistance of counsel are governed 
by rule 65B(b) (now rule 65Q); Padilla v. 
State Bd of Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 
667 (Utah 1997) (stating that "Rule 65B(c) 
[governing wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty] cannot be used to challenge Board [of 
Pardons] actions that might be challenged 
under Rule 65B(e) [governing wrongful use of 
judicial authority]") (citation omitted); Earle 
v. Warden, 811 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah 1991) 
(concluding that postconviction petition 
alleging that trial court committed reversible 
error in "refusing to allow [petitioner] to 
withdraw his guilty plea" is governed by rule 
65B(i) (now rule 65Q); Andrews v. Shulsen, 
113 P.2d 832, 833 (Utah 1988) (petition 
challenging conviction based on erroneous 
jury instruction was "governed by Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 65B(i)" (now 65C)); 
Lancaster v. Cook, 753 P.2d 505, 506 (Utah 
1988) (postconviction claims "challeng[ing] 
the validity of [petitioner's] guilty plea" are 
governed by rule 65B(i) (now rule 65Q); 
Andrews v. Morris, 611 P.2d 81, 85 (Utah 
1983) (postconviction claims alleging "denial 
of due process and equal protection" are 
properly "review [ed] under [r]ule 65B(i)" 
(now rule 65C)): Andrews v. Morris, 607 
P.2d 816, 818. 821 (Utah) (petitioner's 
postconviction claims that he was, inter alia, 
"deprived ... of a trial by a fair and impartial 
jury" were governed by rule 65B(i) (now rule 
65Q), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 
254, 66 L.Ed.2d 120 (1980). 
Other jurisdictions, recognizing the difference 
between postconviction relief focused on a 
conviction and extraordinary relief based on 
wrongful restraint of personal liberty, i.e., the 
traditional writ of habeas corpus, have 
likewise held that postconviction relief is the 
proper avenue for challenging a conviction. 
See, e.g., Jacobs v. Carmel, 869 P.2d 207, 
209-10 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (holding that 
petitioner's claims-alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel and challenging his 
plea--are proper ly resolved via 
"postconviction motion" and relief "may not 
be obtained by writ of habeas corpus"); 
Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 924 P.2d 
1225, 1228 & n. 1 (Idaho Ct.App.1996) 
(stating that "once the time for a direct appeal 
has expired, the exclusive vehicle to present a 
claim that a conviction or sentence was 
entered in violation of constitutional or 
statutory law is an application for 
post-conviction relief under the [Idaho 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act]," 
although "[o]ther types of challenges to an 
inmate's incarceration... including challenges 
to the conditions of confinement, may 
continue to be asserted in a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus"); People ex rel Walker v. 
Twomev, 9 Ill.App.3d 544. 291 N.E.2d 833, 
835(1973) (holding that "[a] claim of denial 
of the constitutional right to counsel cannot be 
determined on a writ of habeas corpus"; 
rather, such claim is properly resolved via 
"post-conviction petition"); Bates v. 
Czerniak, 187 Or.App. 8. 66 P.3d 519. 520 
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(2003) (affirming dismissal of habeas corpus 
petition challenging guilty plea and noting that 
M[a] petition for post conviction relief is the 
exclusive means for challenging the 
lawfulness of a criminal conviction and the 
proceedings on which it was based[; a]n 
individual may not avail himself of habeas 
corpus relief for this purpose"), review denied, 
69P.3dl232fOr.2003). 
If 21 Typify ing--or at least recognizing~the confusion 
we seek to ameliorate in this opinion, Manning sought 
relief in the trial court "pursuant to Rule 65Bfb) and/or 
65C." Manningrelies on State v. Rees, 2003 UT App 4, 
63P.3dl20. cert, granted, 73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003), in 
support of her argument that "a defendant who is 
requesting resentencing because his right to appeal was 
violated can file a petition for extraordinary relief under 
rule 65B(b)." Rees was accurate insofar as it suggested 
that "coram nobis type relief is still available, id. at f 
5 n. 2; however, it was clearly incorrect in stating that 
"[former] Rule 65B(i) [is] presently embodied in rule 
65B(b)" and that "rule 65Bfb) [is] the successor to the 
writ of error coram nobis." Id. at ya 6, 16. Having 
clarified that rule 65B(b) is really the successor rule to 
the writ of habeas corpus while rule 65C is the 
successor to the writ of error coram nobis, JTN6J we 
now return to the specific arguments made by Manning. 
FN6. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 
n. 3 (Utah 1994) (stating that "[horizontal 
stare decisis does not... require that a panel 
adhere to its own or another panel's prior 
decision with the same inflexibility as does 
vertical stare decisis[; i]nstead, although it 
may not do so lightly, a panel may overrule its 
own or another panel's decision where 'the 
decision is clearly erroneous1 ") (citation 
omitted), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 
S.Ct.910.130L.Ed.2d792(1995). Given the 
Utah Supreme Court's pending consideration 
of this court's opinion in State v. Rees, 2003 
UTApp4,63P.3dl20, cert, granted, 73P.3d 
946 (Utah 2003), we highlight the flaw in its 
analysis but see no need to do more. 
We do note that it is of little practical 
consequence that Rees enunciated a four-part 
test, borrowed from the Ninth Circuit, "that a 
petitioner must satisfy before coram nobis 
type relief can be granted," id. at H 14, since 
those factors substantially track the current 
requirements of the PCRA. See Utah Code 
Ann. SS 78-35a-104. -106 (2002). 
Nevertheless, while the Rees factors may well 
serve as a useful guideline in determining 
whether a postconviction petition is 
meritorious, the substantive and procedural 
provisions outlined in the PCRA control and 
should be the primary frame of reference in 
evaluating such petitions. 
*205 V. Analysis of Manning's Claims 
\ 22 Manning contends that she "did not knowingly 
and voluntarily waive her right to appeal"; "she was 
given confusing information as to any right of appeal 
she might have after pleading guilty"; she "was also not 
told that she was required to file a notice of appeal 
within thirty days of sentencing"; and the fact that she 
"filed a notice from jail within... fifty-seven days after 
sentencing" demonstrates that she "did not waive the 
right to appeal." She additionally claims that she "was 
not clearly and adequately advised of the nature of her 
right to appeal" and she was "deprived of her right to 
counsel during the period for perfecting the appeal." 
However, she has made no substantive argument as to 
how she was prejudiced by missing the opportunity to 
appeal or what grounds for appeal existed. [FN71 
FN7. Manning's position on appeal is circular, 
at best. She seeks to invalidate her guilty plea 
because she was not fully advised of her right 
to appeal, which she insists should now entitle 
her to the opportunity to appeal. If 
resentenced, her principal complaint on 
appeal-that she had been misinformed about 
her right to appeal when her guilty plea was 
taken- would necessarily be mooted. 
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A. Denial of the Right to Appeal 
If 23 Acknowledging that both Bozzess and Johnson 
speak in terms of the right to an appeal being "denied," 
see Bozzess v. Morris. 635 P.2d 39, 39 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), 
Manning nonetheless argues that "the appropriate 
inquiry in determining whether a defendant has been 
deprived of appeal rights and therefore should be 
resentenced is to determine whether the circumstances 
demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the 
right to appeal." In other words, Manning equates 
"denial" of appellate rights with mere waiver of 
appellate rights, unless it is shown-apparently by the 
State—that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. The 
State counters that more than passively letting appellate 
rights lapse is required by the concept of "denial." 
Indeed, in both Bozzess and Johnson attorneys were or 
may have been instructed to file appeals but opted or 
allegedly opted not to do so. In other words, the 
defendants in those cases were denied or possibly 
denied their appellate rights due to the malfeasance of 
their attorneys. 
| 24 To further crystallize the issue framed by the 
parties, this explanation may be helpful: Both sides 
agree that if a defendant who wishes to appeal is denied 
that right-by an attorney who fails to file a notice of 
appeal or, say, a prison official who refuses to mail to 
an attorney a defendant's instructions to file an 
appeal—the defendant should be resentenced to 
resurrect the right to appeal. Both sides agree that if a 
defendant knows of her right to appeal but voluntarily 
chooses to forego it, a change of heart after the 30-day 
period for filing an appeal does not entitle her to be 
resentenced. The disagreement is about what to do with 
cases in the gray area between those two rather clear 
situations. Manning contends that if it cannot be shown 
that the right to appeal was affirmatively waived, then 
it must be concluded that the defendant was denied that 
right and is entitled to be resentenced. The State 
contends that unless a defendant affirmatively sought to 
exercise the right to appeal, and it was denied as a result 
of the action or inaction of another person, the 
defendant is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of 
resentencing. 
r9iri01 If 25 Given the facts and holdings of Johnson 
and Bozzess, we essentially agree with the State. The 
question of whether the right to appeal a conviction has 
been denied is a function of availability of that right. 
The question is answered by determining whether the 
State or defense counsel closes the *206 door to the 
right of appeal, or whether the defendant simply 
chooses not to open it. In the context of this case, 
where Manning pled guilty, all that is required for her 
to choose not to exercise the right of appeal is 
knowledge that the right exists followed by her own 
inaction. The knowledge requirement was satisfied by 
the trial court's compliance with rule life) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that the 
court find that "the defendant has been advised of the 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea" 
and "has been advised that the right of appeal is 
limited" before the court may accept a guilty plea. Utah 
R.Crim.P. 11(e)(7), (8). Once the defendant has been 
given sufficient information to allow the court to make 
such a finding, it is up to the defendant to exercise the 
right. In the present context, in order to conclude that 
a criminal defendant has been "denied" that right, the 
interference with a defendant's exercise of the right to 
appeal must originate in the criminal justice system. 
For instance, the mishandling of prison mail by a 
corrections officer or the ineffective assistance of 
defense counsel would be the basis for resentencing to 
restart appeal rights if such occurrences thwarted a 
defendant's intention to pursue an appeal. Conversely, 
a defendant could not demonstrate that the right to 
appeal was "denied" because he relied, to his detriment, 
on insights about appellate practice from his fellow 
prisoners or on guidance from a brother-in-law whose 
"expertise" is limited to regular watching of Court TV. 
Neither, as likely occurred in this case, does the late 
onset of "buyer's remorse" after several unpleasant 
weeks of incarceration equate to "denial" of the right to 
appeal. 
K 26 Manning relies on several Utah cases to support 
her position that appellate rights that are not exercised 
are necessarily denied if they are not affirmatively 
waived. However, her reliance on these cases is 
misplaced. In Bruner v. Carver. 920 P.2d 1153 (Utah 
1996), Bruner was sentenced to prison after he was 
found guilty of homicide and burglary. See id. at 1154. 
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Although his attorneys "filed a timely notice of appeal," 
Bruner indicated that "he 'was thinking about 
withdrawing the appeal/ " Id_ His attorneys had an 
affidavit delivered to him in prison, which he signed, 
stating his desire to "knowingly and voluntarily ... 
withdraw [his] appeal." Id. The appeal was then 
dismissed and Bruner filed an action seeking to 
reinstate the appeal based on the deficient performance 
of his counsel. See id. at 1155. He argued, among other 
things, that "the withdrawal of his direct appeal was 
inconsistent with due process requirements because ... 
the district court required him to bear the burden of 
proving that the withdrawal of his direct appeal was not 
knowing and voluntary." IcL The Court determined that 
"because the prior judgment carries a presumption of 
validity, the trial court correctly assigned to Bruner the 
burden of showing a constitutional violation." Id. 
Bruner's "appeal was filed and was proceeding 
routinely until he personally requested that it be 
withdrawn." Id. at 1156. Therefore, there was no 
question as to whether the right to appeal had been 
denied; instead it was a question of whether he 
voluntarily chose to withdraw the appeal. Thus, Bruner 
was not within the gray area mentioned above because 
he voluntarily chose to forgo the right to appeal. 
f i l l t 27 Conversely, in cases where another actor 
interferes with the defendant's attempt to file an appeal, 
it is logical to view the right as having been denied. 
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d36,38 (Utah 1981) 
(stating that if "within the statutory period for appeal 
[defendant] requested counsel to take an appeal and 
counsel gave defendant reason to believe that he would 
but then failed to do so[, then] defendant was denied a 
constitutional right") (emphasis added). In this 
instance, Manning was not prevented from filing a 
timely appeal, she did not instruct her attorney to file a 
timely appeal, no timely appeal was filed, and we have 
no occasion to address whether any withdrawal of 
appeal was knowing and voluntary JTN8] 
FN8, Manning argues that the time for appeal 
could have been extended under rule 4(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See 
Utah R.App. 4(e) (stating that "[t]he trial 
court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or 
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good cause, may extend the time for filing a 
notice of appeal upon motion filed not later 
than 30 days after the expiration of the [30-
day period] prescribed by paragraph (a) of this 
rule"). However, this argument is without 
merit because Manning did not file a motion 
pursuant to rule 4(e) and there is no "showing 
of excusable neglect or good cause" that 
would have given the trial court discretion to 
extend the time for filing an appeal. Id. 
*207 \ 28 Manning's reliance on State v. Turtle, 713 
P.2d 703 (Utah 1985). is also unavailing. That case 
arose in a distinct context that offers no insight in to 
how to deal with "gray area" cases generally. In Tuttle, 
the defendant was convicted and sentenced, filed a 
notice of appeal, and then escaped from prison. See id_ 
at 704. After Turtle's escape, the Utah Supreme Court 
dismissed his appeal, stating that "one who escapes 
places himself beyond the reach of the judicial system," 
but upon his return to the State's custody the appeal was 
reinstated. H The Court rejected the State's argument 
that Tuttle "abandoned his appeal" by escaping and 
decided that the "more reasonable assumption [was] 
that the escapee ha[d] not even considered how his 
escape [would] affect his appeal rights." Id^ The Court 
determined that "automatically denying reinstatement of 
an escapee's appeal upon a return to custody really 
amounts to imposition by this Court of a punishment for 
escape." Id. at 704-05. Thus, due to the "serious due 
process and equal protection questions" raised by 
refusing to reinstate an escapee's appeal, id. at 705, it 
could not be concluded that Tuttle voluntarily chose to 
forgo the right to appeal. 
K 29 Manning argues that she "was not clearly and 
adequately advised of the nature of her right to appeal." 
The suggestion is that this incomplete advice-she does 
not contend she was affirmatively misled about her right 
to appeal-worked a denial of her right to appeal. 
However, the record does not support her claim. Her 
plea affidavit included the following sentence: "I 
understand that by pleading guilty/no contest I am 
waiving my rights to file an appeal." At the plea 
hearing, however, after explaining the rights associated 
with trial, the judge correctly stated: "Your right to 
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appeal these pleas of guilty is very limited. You 
understand that to be the case?" Manning was 
additionally informed by the court at the plea hearing 
that she had 30 days to withdraw her guilty plea, which 
she never sought to do. TFN91 
FN9. Manning claims that the court erred in 
its failure to inform her, after the issuance of 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. 
Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528, that she had 
30 days from sentencing in which to file a 
motion to withdraw her plea. See supra note 
1. However, she concedes that this error does 
not affect this appeal because she never sought 
to withdraw her guilty plea. 
ri2iri311f 30 It is well established that "a defendant 
[can] not simply appeal a conviction based on a guilty 
plea[, but] must first file a motion to withdraw [the] 
plea, giving the court who took the plea the first chance 
to consider defendant's arguments." Summers v. Cook, 
759 P.2d341, 342 OJtahCt.App. 1988). The "failureto 
do so extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the 
validity of the guilty plea on appeal." State v. Reyes, 
2002 UT 13,If 3,40 P.3d 630. Thus, even if we assume 
that Manning was given incomplete information 
regarding the nature of her right to appeal, [FN 10] she 
was aware that *208 there was a limited time frame 
within which she could seek to withdraw her plea, and 
she admits she never filed a motion to withdraw her 
plea. 
FN10. As indicated above, see supra note 7, it 
is difficult to see where this argument, even if 
successful, leads Manning. The usual thrust of 
an argument raising a problem with a plea 
colloquy is that the plea was not knowingly 
and voluntarily entered due to the trial court's 
failure to comply with rule 11. See Utah 
R.Crim. P. 11. See also In re Hill 621 P.2d 
705, 706-07 (Utah 1980) (holding that 
unrepresented defendant was allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea due to trial court's 
failure to explain the con sequences of his 
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plea); State v. Tarnawiecki 2000 UT App 
186, If 1f 16-18, 5 P.3d 1222 (holding that 
defendant was allowed to withdraw guilty plea 
due to trial court's failure to advise her of right 
to speedy trial before impartial jury). In other 
words, with reference to the cases cited, 
Tarnawiecki would likely not have pled guilty 
if she had known of her right to a speedy trial 
before an impartial jury, and Hill would not 
have pled guilty if he had known the 
consequences of pleading guilty to a felony. 
That logic does not apply to Manning, who 
knew her rights associated with trial and the 
consequences of her plea. Her only claim is 
that she did not fully understand the nature of 
her right to appeal. The court stated that her 
"right to appeal these pleas of guilty is very 
limited," and the plea statement indicated that 
by pleading guilty she waived her "rights to 
file an appeal." Even if she understood that 
her right to appeal was more limited than it 
actually was, it is illogical for her to argue that 
she would not have entered a guilty plea if she 
had known that the right of appeal was 
actually more extensive than she believed. In 
fact, she is in the same position as a defendant 
who pled guilty after being told that she had 
the right to be acquitted within the next week, 
when in fact she only had the right to a speedy 
trial before an impartial jury. She is also in 
the same position as a defendant who pled 
guilty even though he was told that the 
maximum punishment was being burned at the 
stake, when in fact a brief jail sentence was 
the maximum available sanction. There is no 
prejudice in these situations, where a typical 
defendant would be even less likely to plead 
guilty in light of the information they received 
than would a defendant who had been 
properly advised. Furthermore, we note that 
the information provided by the trial court 
during the plea colloquy was in line with rule 
11, which requires the court to advise, as 
concerns appeal rights, only "that the right of 
appeal is limited" before accepting a guilty 
plea. Utah R.Crim. P. l i t e m 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
89P.3dl96 
89 P.3d 196, 496 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 2004 UT App 87 
(Cite as: 89 P.3d 196) 
Page 14 
B. Right to Counsel 
1f 31 Manning's final argument for resentencing is that 
she was "deprived of her right to counsel during the 
period for perfecting the appeal." She admits that she 
"did not inform counsel that she wished to appeal," but 
claims that her "trial counsel performed deficiently in 
failing to advise [her] following sentencing regarding 
the nature of her right to appeal and the time limit for 
perfecting an appeal." TFN111 To prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "a defendant 
must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment and, second, that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Bundvv. Deland 763 P.2d 803. 805 (Utah 1988). See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687,104 S.Ct. 
2052. 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 f 1984V 
FN11. She does not claim that she ever asked 
counsel for a fuller explanation of exactly 
what her "limited" appeal rights entailed, 
notwithstanding having ample opportunity to 
do so. 
ri41 \ 32 In the context of Manning's claim, 
"Strickland's holding that 'the performance inquiry 
must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances'" is applicable. Roe 
v. Flores-Orteea. 528 U.S. 470, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 
1035,145 L.Ed.2d985 (2000) (quoting Strickland 466 
U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065). The primary question 
in this case is whether counsel's failure to advise 
Manning about the specific details of her limited right 
to appeal constitutes deficient performance. The 
Supreme Court has held 
that counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to 
consult with the defendant about an appeal when 
there is reason to think either (1) that a rational 
defendant would want to appeal (for example, 
because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), 
or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably 
demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in 
appealing. 
Id at 480, 120 S.Ct. at 1036 (emphasis added). The 
Court explained that such a judgment is based on "all 
the information counsel knew or should have known" 
and that "a highly relevant factor ... [is] whether the 
conviction follows a trial or a guilty plea, both because 
a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable 
issues and because such a plea may indicate that the 
defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings." Id. A 
further consideration is "whetherthe defendant received 
the sentence bargained for as part of the plea." Id, 
K 3 3 In this case, Manning entered into a favorable plea 
agreement and obtained a sentence that should have 
been expected. She pled guilty to the charges of 
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, failure to 
render a proper tax return, and theft. In exchange, the 
State dismissed three second degree felony charges and 
reduced the second degree felony charge of theft by 
deception to the third degree felony charge of theft. 
Under the plea agreement, the State also agreed not to 
file any additional charges arising out of her criminal 
conduct and not to file any charges against Manning's 
daughter for her involvement. 
t 34 Her attorney stated at the plea hearing that 
Manning had "participated in the preparation of the 
written plea statement. Manning stated that her attorney 
had "taken the time to extend himself to adequately and 
*209 properly serve me, and I'm satisfied with his 
service." It is undisputed that she did not request that 
an appeal be filed. Furthermore, Manning met with her 
attorney three or four times after sentencing, at least 
some of which meetings were during the time allowed 
for filing an appeal, and thus had ample opportunity to 
air any dissatisfaction with her sentence, concern about 
her guilty plea, or interest in appealing. We cannot 
believe that a rational defendant in Manning's position 
would have wanted to appeal, and Manning failed to 
demonstrate to her attorney any interest in appealing. 
rFN12] Although Manning ultimately filed an untimely 
pro se notice of appeal, this late onset of "buyer's 
remorse" has no bearing on whether "counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Strickland 466 U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct. 
at 2064. In sum, Manning has failed to demonstrate any 
objectively deficient performance on the part of her 
counsel. 
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FN12. Given Manning's favorable plea 
bargain and sentence, the available grounds 
for appeal appear to be very limited. She 
could appeal her sentence if she believed it 
was unlawful and she could challenge the 
voluntariness of her guilty plea if the trial 
court denied a motion for leave to withdraw 
the plea. The ordered one-year of 
incarceration, with credit for time served, was 
well within the range of the trial court's 
discretion. The two third degree felonies each 
carried a possible sentence of zero to five 
years and the second degree felony carried a 
possible sentence of one to fifteen years. 
Manning never filed a motion to withdraw her 
guilty plea, even though she was informed at 
the plea hearing that she had 30 days to do so, 
and she never suggested that the plea was 
involuntary. Her claim is essentially that she 
wants to appeal because she was not fully 
informed of the nature of the right to appeal. 
This type of circular reasoning, more fully 
critiqued in notes 7 and 10, does not provide 
a basis for a rational defendant to appeal or a 
reason to invalidate the plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Tf 3 5 The trial court correctly denied Manning's petition 
for postconviction relief. Its decision is therefore 
affirmed. 
11 36 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge. 
89 P.3d 196,496 Utah Adv. Rep. 26,2004 UT App 87 
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